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MANIPULATING THE SHORTS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A fear of manipulative short squeezes acts as an indirect constraint on short-selling. We 
investigate if this fear has firm foundations, by examining a stock lending dataset for evidence of 
patterns consistent with manipulative short squeezes. From a sample comprising nearly half a 
million firm days, we find only twenty examples of manipulative patterns. We observe 
statistically and economically significant abnormal returns around these events. These are 
followed by a price reversal, but short-sellers who have covered their positions do not benefit 
from this effect. Market data such as volatility of stock returns, trading volume, liquidity, and 
stock loan fees and utilization rates might be expected to assist in anticipating manipulative short 
squeezes. However, it is difficult to predict manipulative short squeezes from this data alone. 
 
Key words: short selling, stock manipulation, short squeeze 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although both long and short investors can become victims of stock manipulation, short-sellers 
are particularly vulnerable due to the possibility of stock loan recall.  When a stock loan is 
recalled and cannot be replaced, the short-seller must cover his position by buying stock in the 
market. Thus, a stock loan recall has the potential to create “forced trading”, making 
manipulation more effective. 
From a series of interviews conducted between 2004 and 2009, we find that a number of 
practising and prospective short-sellers fear becoming victims of manipulative short squeezes. 
This concern can serve to limit the extent of short-selling in a market, and so acts as an indirect 
constraint on short-selling.  Jacobs and Levy (2007) assert that the fear of short squeezes deters 
some short-sellers, but that this fear is largely unfounded as short squeezes are rare events and 
confined to illiquid stocks. The authors do not, however, provide any evidence to back up this 
claim. We use data from the stock lending market to investigate their contention and to address 
the following research question: “should short-sellers fear manipulative short squeezes?” 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to define some key terms. A ‘short squeeze’ is described 
by Dechow et al. (2001) as a situation where a stock loan is recalled and the stock borrower is 
unable to find an alternative lender. The stock borrower must then buy shares in the open market 
to repay the stock loan and to close the position.1 Where a short-squeeze occurs in a highly liquid 
stock, short-covering would incur trading and opportunity costs, but would have little market 
impact. However, a short squeeze in a stock with poor liquidity could have market impact, 
imposing losses on the short-seller.  
Stock loan recalls and short squeezes are frequently described in the literature, but are rarely 
researched further. One exception is D’Avolio (2002), who investigates stock loan recalls and 
finds that it can be difficult to re-borrow stock after a recall. He finds that 2% of stocks on loan 
                                                           
1
 A similar definition is offered by Duffie et al. (2002): “The lender may opt out of a continuing lending 
arrangement by issuing a recall notice, in which case the borrower must return the stock.” …“In some cases, called 
‘short squeezes’, the borrower (or its broker) is unable to locate lendable shares and is ‘bought in’, that is, must buy 
the stock outright. If the borrower fails to deliver the security in standard settlement time, the lender itself may buy it, 
using the cash collateral.” 
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are recalled during an average month, and that it takes a mean of 23 days (and a median of 9 
days) to replace a recalled stock loan. Where unable to replace a stock loan, a short-seller may 
cover his short position or default on his stock loan. Accordingly, stock loan recalls can be used 
to induce short-covering, thus making manipulation more effective. 
Short squeezes can be classified as ‘non-manipulative’ or ‘manipulative’. A ‘non-manipulative 
short squeeze’ occurs naturally when a stock lender recalls his stock (say, to settle a stock sale) 
and the short-seller is unable to replace his stock loan, due to limited supply. By contrast, a 
‘manipulative short squeeze’ is associated with deliberate recall by the stock lender as part of a 
broader manipulation strategy. This paper examines situations in which short-sellers become the 
victims of manipulative short squeezes.  
The literature on security price manipulation offers insights into the characteristics of a 
manipulative short squeeze. According to Allen and Gale (1992), manipulation can be 
‘information-based’ (spreading false rumours or using false accounting); ‘action-based’ (e.g. 
launching a spurious take-over bid); or ‘trade-based’ (e.g. ‘pump and dump’ trading). In the 
latter case, a manipulator ‘pumps up’ the share price with buying. Unable to distinguish between 
informed buying and manipulative buying, positive feedback traders are attracted to the rising 
share price and buy shares in the company, leading to further stock price increases. The 
manipulator then ‘dumps’ his stock at the higher price, securing a profit. There is also empirical 
evidence that ‘pump and dump’ manipulation can secure profits for manipulators: Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) study 32 months of broker trades on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) and find 
evidence of trade-based ‘pump and dump’ price manipulation. Easterbrook (1986) and Pirrong 
(1995) examine commodity markets and argue that a sharp rise in the price of a commodity, 
followed by a fall of similar size, is characteristic of manipulation. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) 
study U.S. SEC actions in stock manipulation cases and find that prices trend throughout the 
manipulation period and reverse in the post-manipulation period.  
A ‘manipulative short squeeze’ should follow this same general pattern of ‘pump and dump’ but 
also involves the recall of a stock loan. Consider a situation where a manipulator owns shares in 
a company and those shares are out on loan to a short-seller. The manipulator wishes to ‘pump 
up’ the share price and so buys additional shares in the company, demanding liquidity from the 
market. Simultaneously, he recalls the stock that is on loan. If the short-seller is unable to locate 
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new stock to borrow, he must cover his position by buying stock in the open market. The market 
impact of these purchases places further upwards pressure on the stock price. The short-seller 
suffers a loss as he covers his position at a price above the initial, undisturbed share price. 
Finally, the manipulator ‘dumps’ his shares at the new, higher share price. In so doing, he 
secures a profit and completes the manipulation process. 
A manipulative short squeeze thus combines (at least) two of the three classes of manipulation 
described by Allen and Gale (1992): trade-based manipulation (‘pump and dump’) and action-
based manipulation (stock loan recall). We refer to the full process as ‘pump, squeeze, and 
dump’ and an understanding of this process informs our methodology for detecting such events.  
There are considerable practical challenges to researching this topic. Jiang et al. (2005) show that 
it is difficult to use market data to distinguish between manipulations and informed trading. 
Additionally, stock lending markets are decentralized and publicly available data does not 
explicitly identify stock loan recalls. Thus, it is not possible to affirmatively identify a 
manipulative short squeeze from public data on stock lending or short-selling – it is only possible 
to infer stock loan recalls from patterns in the data. Even with private data that reveals stock loan 
recalls, the motivation behind a recall will remain unknown. Mahoney (1999) argues that it is 
difficult to test for profitable manipulation in actual trading, as manipulation is likely to be 
disguised. Fischel and Ross (1991) argue that trade based manipulation is often confounded by 
false statements and fictitious trades, making it difficult to affirmatively identify manipulation 
from direct questioning of market participants. In light of the practical difficulties in identifying 
manipulative short squeezes, it is little surprise that this topic is under-researched and poorly 
understood.  
To overcome these problems, we define a pattern of market data with respect to stock returns and 
total shares on loan that is consistent with a manipulative short squeeze. We call such an event an 
‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. We describe a set of rules for identifying apparent 
manipulative short squeezes in the methodology section.2  
We use a specially gathered set of panel data to investigate manipulative short squeezes with the 
                                                           
2
 Our approach is similar to research into technical analysis, such as tests of technical trading strategies (for example, 
Hsu & Kuan, 2005; Ready, 2002; Savin et al., 2007) but, in addition, matches trading patterns to underlying stock 
borrowing activities. 
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aim examining the frequency and nature of such events, the losses that short-sellers suffer, and 
the type of stocks affected. We find that manipulative short squeezes are, indeed, rare, but that 
short-sellers experience permanent losses as a result of short-covering during these events.  
Short-sellers can take practical steps to mitigate recall risk, including paying additional fees to 
borrow on a ‘term basis’ (i.e. for a fixed period of time) rather than on a call basis (i.e. with 
repayment of the loan on demand); and borrowing more shares than initially required so as to 
create a ‘buffer’ against stock loan recall. Both of these mitigation techniques incur a cost, 
however. In effect, this creates a trade-off between an indirect constraint (the risk of a 
manipulative short squeeze) and a direct constraint (the mitigation cost).  
This topic is important because the fear of manipulation can constrain short-selling. As short-
selling plays an important role in the process of arbitrage and price discovery, such indirect 
constraints on short-selling can inhibit information from being reflected in a market, thus 
influencing asset pricing. Nevertheless, this topic remains under-researched, perhaps because of 
the challenges involved in identifying manipulation. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the data we use to 
investigate manipulative short squeezes. In section 3, we describe our methodology. We then 
present the results of our tests in Section 4. In the final section we offer some conclusions. 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1  Data Sources 
 
To research this topic, we merge data from two sources. The first of these is a commercial 
database of U.K. stock lending data from Index Explorers Ltd3. This contains daily information 
on stock lending starting on September 3rd 2003 when the database came into existence. At 
inception, this database included stocks from the 350 largest companies traded on the London 
                                                           
3
 Index Explorers data has also been used by Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) and Mackenzie and Hendry (2008). 
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Stock Exchange. The amount of stock on loan is updated daily, but with a three day reporting lag 
(before December 12th, 2005 the lag was five days). Over time, the coverage of companies in the 
database increases through the addition of smaller capitalization stocks so that by the end date 
for this sample, May 31st 2007, there is stock lending data for 681 companies. The smallest of 
these companies have market capitalizations of approximately £25 million (approximately 
U.S.$40 million) as of 2007. A number of companies cease to exist at some point during the 45 
months (979 trading days) studied. This could be as a result of a merger or acquisition, the 
lapsing of the company into administrative receivership, or a change to private ownership. Such 
companies are included in the database until the date of their de-listing, to prevent survivorship 
bias. We make use of all stocks in the database and all dates in the sample for which stock 
lending data is available. 
The Index Explorers database includes the following daily information for each stock:  
• Date 
• Name of company 
• SEDOL (a unique company identifier code) 
• Turnover (defined as the number of shares traded that day)  
• Stock Price (defined as the previous day’s closing stock price) 
• Volume (defined as turnover multiplied by stock price) 
• Market Capitalisation (defined as number of shares in issue multiplied by stock price) 
• Shares on Loan (defined as the number of shares reported to CREST as being on loan) 
• Volume on Loan (defined as shares on loan multiplied by stock price) 
• Percentage of Market Capitalization on Loan (defined as the volume of shares on loan 
divided by the market capitalization) 
• Dividend Record Dates (the dates on which the recorded owners of shares on that day 
become entitled to receive the next dividend payment) 
• Stock Utilisation Rate (the percentage of shares available for borrowing that are actually 
borrowed) 
• Weighted Mean Stock Lending Fees (a weighted average of the fees paid by stock 
borrowers to stock lenders on initiation of the stock loan, measured as a proportion of the 
value of shares borrowed). 
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We use Datastream to obtain stock return data, book value per share, and free float percentage of 
shares for all the firms in our universe.4 To facilitate the estimation of abnormal stock returns 
using an asset pricing model, we collect stock returns data for the year before the start of the 
Index Explorers database. This ‘formation period’ runs from September 1st 2002 to September 1st 
2003 and is used to estimate the beta of each stock in the study.  
Using each company’s SEDOL code as a unique identifier to reconcile stocks across the two 
databases, we merge the two databases to form an unbalanced panel of data for between 350 and 
681 companies covering 979 trading days. 
 
2.2 Stock Lending as a Proxy for Short-Selling 
 
Direct data on short-selling is not publicly available in the U.K. Instead, stock lending data is 
available, on a daily basis. Stock lending acts as a proxy for short-selling, as the process of short-
selling generally requires stock to be borrowed to facilitate settlement of the trade.5 However, 
there are a number of problems with using stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling.  
First, stock does not need to be borrowed to undertake ‘naked’ short-selling (i.e. short-selling 
where there is no intention of subsequently settling the trade). This practice is prohibited or 
actively discouraged in most markets. 
Second, stock lending can occur for reasons other than short-selling, including borrowing stock 
so as to exercise a vote at a firm’s General Meeting. Such a strategy would be illegal in the U.S., 
but it is merely regarded as unethical in the U.K. To prevent this practice, stock lenders are 
recommended to recall loaned stock prior to voting dates.6 Another strategy involving stock 
borrowing is ‘dividend tax arbitrage’, a strategy that is feasible when a ‘borrower’ has a tax 
                                                           
4
 Free float percentage of shares is defined as the percentage of the total number of shares of a firm in issue that are 
available to ordinary investors (i.e. that are not held away from the market by government or close family interests). 
 
5
 Other papers that use securities lending data include D’Avolio (2002), Cohen et al. (2007), Saffi and Sigurdsson 
(2007) and MacKenzie and Henry (2008). 
6
 Myners Report, 2001. http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/media/DCB/53/myners_principles_web.pdf 
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advantage over the ‘lender’. Christoffersen et al. (2002, 2005) demonstrate increases in securities 
lending around dividend record dates. To minimize the risk that stock lending for dividend tax 
arbitrage is confounded with borrowing to facilitate short-selling, we remove data from three 
weeks before until three weeks after the dividend record date for each stock in this study of stock 
lending data. This is consistent with the method employed by Saffi & Sigurdsson (2007). 
 
Third, the extent to which market practitioners fail to fulfil their obligations to report stock 
lending to the market authorities is a further limitation on the use of stock lending data as a proxy 
for short-selling. Discussions with practitioners involved in stock lending suggest that this 
problem is rare, but unavoidable. 
Finally, derivatives can be used to effect transactions that are economically equivalent to short-
selling (see, for example, Ofek et al., 2004). The extent to which the use of derivatives to 
facilitate short-selling is transmitted into the stock lending market influences the usefulness of 
stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling. Discussions with stock-lending practitioners 
suggests that the majority, but not all, short-sale-equivalent trades using derivatives are 
ultimately hedged by the counter-parties to those trades, through borrowing stock and selling 
short.  
 
2.3 Advantages and Limitations of the Dataset 
 
A number of studies into short-selling make use of monthly data (e.g. Senchack and Starks, 1993 
and Dechow et al., 2001, Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor, 2007). However, Christophe et al. (2007) 
criticise the use of monthly short-selling data, as it “represents only a snap-shot of total shorted 
shares on one day during the month.” Cohen et al. (2007) find that almost half the securities 
lending contracts they study are closed out within two weeks, while the median contract length is 
11 days. This suggests that monthly data could be inadequate for understanding the trading 
practices of short-sellers. This study uses daily data on shares borrowed, and this higher 
frequency data allows for an appropriate degree of granularity for research into short-selling.  
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Due to differences in regulatory and institutional frameworks, evidence from studies of U.S. data 
is not necessarily representative of behaviour outside the U.S. markets. For example, in the U.K., 
the Financial Services Authority does not impose specific restrictions or controls on short-selling, 
unlike in the U.S. Instead, short-sellers are subject to general market and regulatory 
arrangements, including market abuse principles. Furthermore, studying data from outside the 
U.S. can be used to counter the criticism that observed regularities in empirical studies are 
simply due to data snooping. A limited number of studies investigate short-selling outside the 
U.S. (e.g. Aitken et al., 1998, Biais et al., 1999, Poitras, 2002, Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005, 
Au et al., 2007, Loncarski et al., 2009). However, these studies do not involve an investigation 
into manipulation, as considered in this paper.  
Geczy et al. (2002) examines shares available for borrowing (and thus available for shorting), 
based on a single lender of stock for a twelve month period. D’Avolio (2002) examines an 
eighteen month period of data from one stock lender. This research contributes to the empirical 
literature on short selling and manipulation in that it draws on a longer time period than either 
Geczy et al. or D’Avolio, and uses market-wide data on stock lending. In doing so, it adddresses 
the problem of substitution effects across lenders that might be present in studies based upon a 
single stock lender.  
 
2.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dataset forms an ‘unbalanced panel’ dataset in which some cross-sectional units have some 
of the time periods missing. This form of panel is a result of the number of companies recorded 
in the Index Explorers database growing over time as smaller capitalization stocks are added. 
The resulting dataset contains 10,259,946 observations in the overall sample; 6,542,712 of which 
are non-blank. 
In Table 1, descriptive statistics are produced for three points in time: the first day of the sample 
time period for which all the variables existed (01/09/2003), the last day of the sample time 
period (31/05/2007), and the mid-point (15/07/2005).  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Further examination of the time series of percentage of market capitalization on loan series for 
each stock shows that these can be volatile series. Dividend-paying stocks often experience large 
increases in shares on loan around divided record dates, indicating a dividend capture effect that 
is consistent with dividend tax arbitrage. Nevertheless, some cross-sections experience a 
consistently high level through the observed period. During some dates in the sample the 
maximum value for this series exceeds 100% for some companies, signifying that borrowed 
shares have been re-lent. 
 
2.5 Asset Pricing Model for Estimating Abnormal Returns 
 
In choosing an asset pricing model for the purposes of calculating abnormal returns, we note that 
Asquith and Moelbroek (1996) establish that the negative relation between excess returns and 
short positions is robust to a variety of techniques for calculating excess returns. Dechow et al. 
(2001) measure excess returns by adjusting each firm’s return by the equal weighted return for 
all NYSE and AMEX shares over the same time period. They make no adjustment for risk across 
firms and cite previous research in this field that has been robust to changes in the asset pricing 
model used. Figlewski (1981) and Figlewski & Webb (1993) use the CAPM model. Asquith et al. 
(2005) and Boehmer et al. (2008) use several asset pricing models to estimate abnormal returns 
for short-sellers but find no significant difference between the results. Gamboa-Cavazos and 
Savor (2007) apply both benchmark-adjusted returns approach and Fama-French three factors 
regression to study the relationship between short selling activities and subsequent abnormal 
returns, and obtain similar results for both. In fact, results in this research space have been 
uniformly robust to changes in asset pricing model. Noting this, we use the CAPM model for its 
simplicity and its relevance to practitioners. We use 3-month LIBOR as the risk free rate. LIBOR 
is commonly used as a risk-free proxy. We note that this series was ‘well-behaved’ during the 
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period of study, but later became unusually dislocated during the 2007-2009 U.S. and U.K. 
banking crisis.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Definition of an ‘Apparent Manipulative Short Squeeze’ 
 
We draw upon Mahoney’s (1999) suggestion that a large abnormal return in the absence of a 
news announcement, followed by a reversal of similar magnitude (as investors learn that the 
trading was not information-based) is indicative of manipulation. Furthermore, as we are 
interested in cases where borrowed stock is recalled and cannot be replaced, we expect to 
observe a decline in the total shares on loan during the manipulation process. 
We seek to identify patterns of stock returns and changes to shares on loan that are consistent 
with the ‘pump, squeeze and dump’ pattern expected from a manipulative short squeeze. We call 
this an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. Specifically, we identify any situation in which all 
of the following occur: the stock price rises ‘exceptionally’ over some limited time period (the 
‘pump’ phase), followed by a fall in the number of shares on loan (the ‘squeeze’ phase); and 
subsequently, the stock price reverts towards the original, undisturbed level (the ‘dump’ phase). 
Furthermore, these events should not coincide with any regulatory news announcements (these 
can include trading statements, corporate results, announcement of share buybacks, change of 
directors, etc.) This latter requirement avoids the confounding of a manipulative short squeeze 
with reaction to new, public, company-specific information. By requiring that an exceptional 
price rise is followed by a price reversal, we are able to separate a manipulative short squeeze 
from ‘informed’ trading upon private information (a price reversal would not be expected in the 
latter case). This accords with the Diether et al (2009) findings about overreaction in short sales. 
We define an ‘exceptional’ rise in stock price as one that is large relative to the volatility of 
returns for that stock. We identify stock price rises over a three day period as stock loan recalls 
in the U.K. are settled in the same way as stock purchases, meaning that borrowers have three 
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working days to return the stock (Faulkner, 2006)7. Once a stock loan is recalled, a borrower 
who has shorted stock has three options: first, he could successfully find replacement stock; 
second, if unable to successfully find replacement stock, he could delay the return of the stock 
loan for up to three days in the hope of finding an alternative source of borrowing in this time; 
third, he could cover his short position immediately and return the stock loan. Thus, even where 
the ‘pump phase’ coincides with a stock loan recall, it could take up to three days before the 
short-seller covers his position. For this reason, we measure the pump phase over three days. For 
each firm day, we measure the standard deviation of returns for the preceding sixty days. Sixty 
days is sufficiently long to allow for a meaningful estimate of stock return volatility, but also 
short enough to avoid becoming ‘stale’. By measuring return volatility in this way for each firm 
day, we take account of the fact that volatility varies over time. We regard an exceptional stock 
price increase to be one where the stock price rises over any three-day period by at least 2.5 
times the standard deviation of daily returns for that stock. Assuming an approximately Normal 
distribution of stock returns, this method would generally isolate situations that fall within the 
top percentile of stock price changes. 
After receiving an order to return a stock loan, we expect a short-seller will search for alternative 
sources of borrowing. If a replacement loan is found, the short position need not be covered. 
However, the U.K. lending market is decentralized and thus finding replacement shares can take 
time. D’Avolio (2002) observes for his sample of U.S. stocks that when loans are recalled, there 
is usually no immediate replacement available. Since in the U.K. it takes three days to deliver 
purchased stock under standard settlement arrangements, some short-sellers might be expected to 
cover immediately upon loan recall. However, there is another group of borrowers who may 
prefer to delay covering their positions and look for replacement loans in subsequent days. If 
unsuccessful and eventually forced to cover, they will have to pay a premium for the delivery of 
stock to be made in one or two, rather than three days. Moreover, uninformed traders might start 
taking long positions around the same time, believing that the buyers they observe are informed 
market participants (Hong and Stein, 2003). On the whole, there is likely to be a lot of noise in 
the stock price on the days immediately after the recall, but it is realistic to expect that the initial 
                                                           
7
 A typical stock lending agreement in the U.K. requires the return of stock within three days of recall. Failure to 
return recalled stock within this time entitles the lender to claim costs from the borrower, and to serve a written 
notice of ‘Event of Default’, which can have repercussions for the borrower with respect to other counter-parties. 
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stock price rise will start to reverse by the third day after the stock loan recall. We define the 
event date (day 0) as the first day following the exceptional rise in share price on which the 
number of shares on loan falls. We ensure that there are no Regulatory News Service 
announcements from five days prior to the event date until ten days after the event date. Thus, 
the observed patterns are not the result of reactions to new, public information. 
It is not clear over what time period the stock price reversal should take place. Most theoretical 
models of price manipulation assume complete price reversal, but use ‘notional’ time periods 
(for example, Aggarwal and Wu, 2006). Thus, we expect complete price reversal over some 
unknown time period. If we over-estimate the time period, we should expect to observe complete 
price reversal, but are more likely to introduce confounding influences such as a change in 
company or economic fundamentals. By under-estimating the time period, we would expect to 
see partial price reversal only.  Without a good theory on the time taken for a stock price to 
revert fully to its fair value, we prefer to identify partial reversal over a limited time period, as 
this reduces the risk of confounding factors contaminating the study. We report cases with a 
price reversal of at least 70% over a ten day period following the event date.  
 
Estimating Abnormal Returns around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
Having identified a number of ‘apparent manipulative short-squeezes’, we then estimate 
abnormal returns for the stocks involved. As described in Section 2, we use the CAPM model to 
estimate abnormal returns and employ a one-year formation period to estimate betas. 
We estimate abnormal returns for each of the three phases associated with an ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeeze’. “Phase 1” (the ‘pump’ phase) lasts for three days, from day –3 to –1; 
“Phase 2” (the ‘squeeze’ phase) also lasts for three days, from day 0 to day 2; and “Phase 3” (the 
‘dump’ phase) lasts for ten days, from day 3 to day 12.  Figure 2 illustrates these three phases in 
the form of a timeline. 
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The final step is to calculate how much short-sellers lose during these phases. We calculate 
average cumulative abnormal returns from the start of the ‘pump’ phase to the end of the 
‘squeeze’ phase (i.e. from day –3 to day 2). By this time, short covering is expected to be 
complete, and the short-seller should no longer be exposed to stock price movements. However, 
during the ‘pump’ phase (i.e. day -3 to day -1) short-sellers are highly likely to have experienced 
negative abnormal returns, because by definition stock prices were increasing. Including this 
interval in the analysis might result in a biased outcome. As a solution to this problem, we adopt 
an alternative approach that starts to measure cumulative abnormal returns from the event day 
(day zero) until the end of the squeeze phase (day 2). We then test if these returns are statistically 
significantly different from zero, by comparing to the relevant 2.5% t-test statistic with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of companies in the sample minus one. 
 
4. Results 
 
We observe thirty-six incidences where a stock price rises exceptionally, then shares on loan 
decreases, followed by a stock price reversal, in accordance with our explanation from Section 3 
above. Of the thirty-six ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ identified above, sixteen are 
associated with regulatory news announcements. We eliminate these, as it is not possible to 
distinguish between a reaction to a news release and a manipulative short squeeze.  This leaves 
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twenty apparent manipulative short squeezes — a small number of incidences to observe over 
approximately half a million firm days. 
We examine the abnormal returns for stocks involved in ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ 
for each day during the manipulation process (days -3 to 12). We group the companies into 
portfolios and test the null hypothesis of daily returns being equal to zero. Results are reported in 
Table 7. Panel A shows the equally-weighted portfolios: returns for these portfolios are 
significantly different from zero for eight of the 16 days. Panel B shows the market cap-weighted 
portfolios: only two of the 16 days exhibit returns that are significantly different from zero. The 
greatest magnitudes for the daily abnormal returns are observed during the pump phase and on 
the event day. The difference in results between the equally-weighted and market-cap weighted 
portfolios indicates a more profound effect with smaller firms, consistent with Jiang et al., 
(2005). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To consider the potential losses to short-sellers, we estimate the cumulative abnormal returns for 
each phase of the ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. Table 8 presents the results: Panel A 
shows cumulative abnormal returns by phase for the equal-weighted portfolios, and Panel B 
shows cumulative abnormal returns by phase for the market-cap-weighted portfolios. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
From Panel A, we can reject the hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for the equally-weighted 
portfolio for each phase. We observe significant positive abnormal returns of 3.45% in the first 
phase (days –3 to –1) and significant positive abnormal returns of 2.26% in the second phase 
(days 0 to 2). These positive abnormal returns are followed by significant reversals in the third 
phase. In Panel B we observe much lower abnormal returns, as a small number of large-cap stock 
observations have lower abnormal returns but large weights in the portfolio.  The positive 
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abnormal returns in phase one and phase two are significant at the 5% level using a one-tailed 
test. The above results indicate significant losses for short-sellers around apparent manipulative 
short squeezes. 
Table 9 shows cumulative abnormal returns for portfolios by day, rather than by phase, up until 
the start of the expected price reversal. Panel A shows equally-weighted portfolio cumulative 
abnormal returns by day. Cumulative abnormal returns peak at 5.91% by day 1 and start to 
reverse thereafter. We also show the upper and lower thresholds to the 95% confidence intervals 
for these cumulative abnormal returns. Recall that during days –3 to –1 (the ‘pump’ phase) short-
sellers are highly likely to have experienced negative abnormal returns, because stock prices 
were increasing. Including this interval in the analysis might result in a biased outcome. 
Consequently, we adopt an alternative approach in Panel B, and start to measure cumulative 
abnormal returns from event day (day zero). Cumulative abnormal returns peak at 2.47% on day 
1. In Panel C and Panel D, we show the corresponding results for market-cap weighted portfolios. 
Cumulative abnormal returns peak at day 2, at much smaller magnitudes than those of the 
equally-weighted portfolios.   
 
[INSET TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The tables above reveal averages for a portfolio of stocks subject to ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeezes’. By examining the underlying data we observe that the maximum loss a short-seller 
would have suffered from any individual stock was 8.16% in phase one and 13.74% in Phase two. 
Note that a trader or long-short fund manager would normally hold a number of short positions at 
any time. Stocks subject to manipulative short squeezes are likely to form a subset of these short 
positions. When considered in this broader context, the abnormal returns observed above, while 
statistically significant, are likely to be of moderate economic significance.  
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Characteristics of Stock Subject to Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
In the literature, manipulation is associated with smaller stocks (Jiang et al., 2005); stocks with 
lower liquidity (Aggarwal and Wu, 2006); elevated volatility of stock returns (Mahoney, 1999) 
and elevated stock trading volumes (Zhou and Mei, 2003; Aggarwal and Wu, 2006). We 
examine the characteristics of the stocks in our sample that are subject to apparent manipulative 
short squeezes. We develop two proxies for liquidity. First, we compare the free float number of 
shares for each stock with that of the average stock on the event day. Second, we calculate the 
number of days of normal trading volume that it would take for all short-sellers to cover their 
positions. This latter is called the ‘Days to Cover Ratio’ (DCR) and is defined as: 
 
ti,
ti,
ti, Size TradingDaily  Average
Loanon  Shares
 (DCR) RatioCover   toDays =           (2) 
 
Where: 
ti,RatioCover   toDays  is the ‘days to cover ratio’ for stock i on day t. 
ti,Loanon  Shares  is the closing number of shares on loan for stock i on day t. 
 
ti,Size TradingDaily  Average  is the moving average of the number of shares traded for stock i 
from days (t-61) to (t-1). We choose 60 days of trading as a compromise between the risk of 
including out-of-date information on trading volume and the risk of one or more exceptional 
days influencing the moving average figure. 
 
A stock with a high days to cover ratio is deemed to be less liquid (from a short-seller’s 
perspective) than a comparable stock with a lower days to cover ratio. For each day during the 
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manipulation period, we compare the DCR of a stock with its average value over the three 
preceding months. This allows us to observe any trend in this liquidity ratio during the apparent 
manipulative short squeeze. 
 
We measure the volatility of stock returns for each company that is subject to an apparent 
manipulative short squeeze, from 20 days prior to the event date through to 10 days after the 
event date. For each of these days volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of returns for 
the twenty preceding days.8 For each firm day, we compare the stock volatility measure to the 
year’s average for that firm. 
 
For each stock subject to an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’, we record trading volume for 
the five days preceding the start of the manipulation process and compare this to the three month 
average trading volume for the stock.  
 
Table 12 summarizes the key characteristics (size, volatility, trading volume, liquidity, and 
utilisation rate) for each stock and for the portfolio of stocks involved in ‘apparent manipulative 
short squeezes’.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The majority of stocks have market capitalizations of less than one-fifth the market average. This 
provides some support for the argument that smaller companies are more vulnerable to 
manipulative short squeezes. However, a small number of large-cap stocks increase the portfolio 
mean market capitalization, so that it is above the market average. There is some support for the 
notion that the volatility of returns of stocks is elevated ahead of a manipulative short squeeze – 
stock volatility as measured at day 0 during an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’ is slightly 
                                                           
8
 The number of days needs to be as small as possible to grasp the changes in volatility that we expect to see around 
the manipulative short squeeze. Nevertheless, this number still has to be sufficient to calculate reliable standard 
deviations. I choose 20 days as a compromise between these two requirements. 
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above its annual average (at 103.2% of annual average), but this result is not statistically 
significant. The mean trading volume is elevated prior to an ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeeze’ compared to its 3 month average, at 123.6% of its 3 month average, but again this result 
is not statistically significant. The majority of stocks have a free float value of shares less than 
one-fifth the market average. This supports the view that less liquid stocks are more vulnerable 
to and more likely to be the target of manipulation. As an alternative measure of liquidity, we 
examine the number of days of normal trading volume that it takes investors to cover their short 
positions (The Days to Cover Ratio, or DCR). The portfolio mean DCR at day 0 is 103.4% of its 
three month average, but this result is not statistically significant. The percentage of shares on 
loan is not elevated for stocks subject to ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. In conclusion, 
there is weak support for the notion that manipulative short squeezes are associated with stocks 
with smaller market capitalization and free float, elevated trading volume and reduced liquidity.  
 
Using the above observations, we analyse all firms in the dataset to identify stocks that display 
similar qualities to those found in the set of ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. Specifically, 
we identify instances where the market cap and free float value of a company are below the 
market average, and where the stock’s DCR and turnover are above their 60 day average. If a 
stock has more than one day when it satisfies these conditions, we treat every such occurrence as 
a separate event. We find 12,909 firm days satisfying the conditions described above. However, 
there is on average no price response around these occurrences. This suggests that it is difficult 
to predict a manipulative short squeeze based strictly on these size, trading volume, and liquidity 
criteria, as many ‘false positives’ will emerge. 
 
Jacobs and Levy (2007) argue that if a security does become subject to a short squeeze then a 
reduction in the supply of loanable stock is usually signalled by a decline in the rebate rate 
offered by prime brokers, or by warnings from the prime brokers, so the position can be scaled 
back or covered in advance of any demand that borrowed stock be returned. According to this 
argument, short squeezes are rare and can largely be predicted, posing little threat to short-sellers. 
We test this argument on our sample by studying stock loan utilization rates (a measure of the 
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proportion of available stock to borrow that is indeed borrowed), and stock loan fees (i.e. cash 
return – stock loan rebate rate) around the time of the apparent short squeezes. These data are 
shown in the final four columns of Table 6. We find no evidence that utilization rates, and stock 
lending fees rise around the time of the apparent manipulative short squeezes. This is not 
consistent with the argument put forward by Jacobs and Levy (2007). Our findings indicate that 
it is difficult to predict a manipulative short squeeze using publicly available information. It is 
perhaps this characteristic — that these are unpredictable events that can have economic impact 
— that has led to the fear of manipulative short squeezes amongst practitioners. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We examine stock lending data for evidence of patterns consistent with manipulative short 
squeezes. Out of a sample comprising nearly half a million firm days, we identify only 20 ‘pump, 
squeeze, and dump’ patterns that are unrelated to news-flow. However, where they do occur, 
short-sellers lose money. We find statistically significant abnormal returns around these events 
that are also economically significant with an average cumulative stock return of 3.45% in the 
‘pump’ phase, and 2.26% during the ‘squeeze’ phase. These are followed by a price reversal, but 
short-sellers who have covered their positions do not benefit from this effect.  
 
There is some (weak) support for the notion that trading volume and the volatility of stock 
returns is elevated before an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. Liquidity is poorer: it takes 
more days to cover a short position just before the squeeze than on average during the previous 
three months. However, it is difficult to forecast manipulative short squeezes from this data alone. 
 
Our results provide support for the Jacobs and Levy (2007) assertion that short squeezes are rare 
events. Nevertheless, we show that short-sellers lose money at such times and that it is difficult 
to predict short squeezes using market data. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are provided for three points in time: the first day of the sample time period (01/09/2003), the mid-point 
(15/07/2005) of the sample time period and the final day of the sample time period (31/05/2007). The descriptive statistics are 
parameters that measure central tendency, dispersion, minimum/maximum values, number of observations, skewness, kurtosis 
and Jarque-Bera statistics for the logarithms of six variables: stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market 
capitalization on loan, shares on loan, book value per share* and free float number of shares (%).  
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Table 2. Abnormal Returns around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
Table 7 Abnormal Returns around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Returns
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average -0.35% 1.47% 2.33% 2.25% 0.21% -0.21% -0.94% -0.90% -0.62% -0.83% -0.80% -0.37% -0.95% -1.03% -0.28% -0.18%
Std. Deviation 1.42% 1.20% 1.49% 2.13% 2.34% 1.24% 1.51% 2.23% 1.59% 1.28% 1.44% 1.21% 1.95% 1.17% 1.90% 1.78%
t-stat. (abs.) 1.09 5.47 7.00 4.74 0.40 0.75 2.79 1.80 1.75 2.90 2.50 1.38 2.19 3.94 0.66 0.46
Prob. 2 tails 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.46 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.52 0.65
Prob. 1 tail 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.32
Panel B: Market Cap-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Returns
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average -0.01% 0.08% 0.06% 0.05% 0.00% 0.04% -0.02% -0.05% -0.01% -0.07% -0.01% 0.01% -0.02% -0.04% 0.00% -0.01%
Std. Deviation 0.03% 0.23% 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.19% 0.07% 0.17% 0.06% 0.19% 0.06% 0.11% 0.09% 0.11% 0.09% 0.03%
t-stat. (abs.) 1.47 1.55 2.61 2.62 0.65 0.93 1.03 1.29 0.72 1.57 0.60 0.55 0.91 1.64 0.21 0.68
Prob. 2 tails 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.52 0.36 0.32 0.21 0.48 0.13 0.56 0.59 0.37 0.12 0.84 0.50
Prob. 1 tail 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.07 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.06 0.42 0.25  
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Table 3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns   
  
      
  
     
  
Panel A. Equally-Weighted Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
  
 
    
  
Phase 1 2 3a 3b 
  
Average 3.45% 2.26% -4.09% -6.91% 
  
Std. Dev. 2.63% 3.43% 4.28% 5.17% 
  
t-stat. (abs.) 5.86 2.95 4.27 5.98 
  
Prob. 2 tails 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
  
Prob. 1 tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
     
  
Panel B. Market Cap-Weighted Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
     
  
Phase 1 2 3a 3b 
  
Average 0.13% 0.10% -0.15% -0.21% 
  
Std. Dev. 0.31% 0.24% 0.32% 0.36% 
  
t-stat. (abs.) 1.92 1.74 2.12 2.60 
  
Prob. 2 tails 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.02 
  
Prob. 1 tail 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 
  
       
Phase 3 has been shown in two ways: as sub-period 3a (days 3 to 7) and full period 3b (days 3 to 12) to provide greater 
granularity. 
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Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Day  
  
      
  
      
  
 
     
  
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolios (starting from day –3) 
  
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Average -0.35% 1.12% 3.45% 5.70% 5.91% 5.71% 4.77% 
Std. Deviation 1.42% 1.81% 2.63% 2.89% 4.53% 4.39% 4.50% 
Std. Error 0.32% 0.40% 0.59% 0.65% 1.01% 0.98% 1.01% 
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.32% 1.97% 4.68% 7.05% 8.03% 7.76% 6.87% 
Conf. Int.: Lower Value -1.01% 0.27% 2.22% 4.35% 3.79% 3.65% 2.66% 
        
        
 
   
    
Panel B: Equally-Weighted Portfolios (starting from day 0) 
  
Day 0 1 2 3 
   
Average 2.25% 2.47% 2.26% 1.32% 
   
Std. Deviation 2.13% 3.57% 3.43% 3.61% 
   
Std. Error 0.48% 0.80% 0.77% 0.81% 
   
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 3.25% 4.14% 3.86% 3.01% 
   
Conf. Int.: Lower Value 1.26% 0.79% 0.65% -0.37% 
   
        
        
 
        
Panel C: Market-Cap Weighted Portfolios (starting from day –3) 
  
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Average -0.01% 0.07% 0.13% 0.19% 0.19% 0.23% 0.21% 
Std. Deviation 0.03% 0.21% 0.31% 0.38% 0.38% 0.55% 0.57% 
Std. Error 0.01% 0.05% 0.07% 0.09% 0.08% 0.12% 0.13% 
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.00% 0.17% 0.28% 0.37% 0.37% 0.49% 0.48% 
Conf. Int.: Lower Value -0.02% -0.03% -0.01% 0.01% 0.02% -0.03% -0.05% 
        
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
Panel D: Market-Cap Weighted Portfolios (starting from day 0) 
  
Day 0 1 2 3 
   
Average 0.05% 0.06% 0.10% 0.08% 
   
Std. Deviation 0.09% 0.08% 0.25% 0.26% 
   
Std. Error 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.06% 
   
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.09% 0.09% 0.21% 0.20% 
   
Conf. Int.: Lower Value 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% -0.04% 
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Table 5. Characteristics of Stock subject to Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
Table 7.6 Characteristics of Stocks subject to Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes
Event 
№
Mkt Cap 
(at day 0 
as % of 
market 
average)
Stock 
Volatility 
(at day 0 as 
% of Year 
Average)
Mean 
Trading 
Volume, days 
-3 to 0 (% of 
3m Average)
Free Float 
(at day 0 
as % of 
Mkt 
Average)
Mean 
DCR (days 
-3 to 0)
DCR (at 
day 0 as % 
of 3m 
Average)
Shares on 
Loan (at 
day 0 as 
% of 3m 
Average)
Mean 
Stock 
Lending 
Fee (days 
-3 to 0)
Mean Stock 
Lending Fee 
(at day 0 as 
% of 3m 
Average)
Mean % 
Stock 
Utilisation 
Rate (days 
-3 to 0)
Mean Stock 
Utilisation 
Rate (at day 
0 as % of 3m 
Average)
1 133.2% 194.8% 176.9% 132.4% 2.5 57.7% 61.2% 10.0 96.9% 6.6 45.3%
2 64.5% 73.1% 87.5% 34.4% 5.7 85.8% 85.9% 15.4 93.2% 11.9 87.9%
3 12.0% 79.3% 337.3% 11.5% 2.5 57.0% 74.2% 59.2 37.4% 3.4 142.4%
4 5.1% 96.9% 3.8% 3.2% 31.9 158.1% 101.8% 61.6 97.2% 37.7 85.1%
5 13.7% 79.2% 26.9% 12.7% 10.2 98.5% 106.5% 59.5 78.7% 3.0 95.6%
6 15.2% 79.8% 28.5% 16.1% 2.0 218.2% 102.0% 28.3 46.0% 0.3 37.2%
7 16.2% 70.0% 290.8% 16.3% 1.2 82.1% 84.7% 222.1 81.2% 1.0 107.1%
8 5.6% 243.6% 40.5% 5.7% 24.6 106.1% 127.2% - - - -
9 73.9% 124.8% 112.9% 69.3% 1.3 52.4% 66.4% 35.8 239.3% 2.3 51.7%
10 31.6% 81.8% 77.6% 23.6% 2.7 110.2% 111.7% - - - -
11 82.6% 70.9% 97.4% 81.0% 3.0 122.8% 118.9% 19.7 87.8% 10.6 96.8%
12 11.3% 90.2% 76.6% 9.3% 11.1 122.6% 110.5% - - - -
13 22.5% 101.8% 282.7% 18.7% 9.2 159.3% 109.1% 21.6 133.0% 19.6 113.5%
14 18.5% 147.0% 98.5% 18.4% 3.9 83.4% 100.2% - - - -
15 13.8% 66.5% 112.6% 10.3% 1.5 82.8% 54.1% - - - -
16 444.8% 114.7% 80.8% 513.7% 5.6 76.9% 68.3% 10.0 111.2% 6.3 71.8%
17 11.1% 103.6% 101.4% 8.4% 4.2 - - - - - -
18 76.5% 71.6% 126.0% 77.8% 12.2 94.9% 95.6% 10.5 76.3% 29.3 89.0%
19 1860.6% 112.5% 163.9% 2154.0% 3.8 91.9% 98.9% 13.6 - 0.1 -
20 27.9% 62.7% 150.4% 27.4% 5.0 - - - - - -
Mean 147.0% 103.2% 123.6% 162.2% 7.2 103.4% 93.2% 43.6 98.2% 10.2 85.3%
St. Dev 414.9% 45.9% 89.8% 482.1% 8.0 41.6% 21.0% 57.1 51.3% 11.9 30.2%
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